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The Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975: The
Unanswered Issues of Carter v. Sparkman
J. B. SPENCE* AND JOEL STILLMAN**
In the wake of rising criticism of Florida's Medical Malprac-
tice Reform Act of 1975, the authors examine several constitu-
tional issues which were not addressed by the supreme court in
its validation of the Act in Carter v. Sparkman. The Act is
criticized as constitutionally deficient on equal protection and
substantive and procedural due process grounds. In their appeal
for reform, the authors present several salient insights into the
burdens placed on medical malpractice claimants under the pres-
ent Act.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The rising cost of medical malpractice insurance in the mid-
1970's' surfaced as a national problem of seemingly overwhelming
magnitude. At least one commentator perceived the situation as
threatening "to disrupt the practice of medicine, the operations of
insurance companies, and ultimately the availability of medical
services.' Although the validity of such hyperbole did not receive
unquestioned acceptance in every community,3 the actions of medi-
* LL.B., 1951, University of Miami. Member of the Florida Bar and partner in the law
firm of Spence, Payne, Masington & Grossman, P.A., Miami, Florida.
** J.D., 1979, University of Miami. Former member, University of Miami Law Review.
1. The total dollar amount spent for medical malpractice insurance in 1966 was
$95,300,000. By 1970, the cost of identical coverage had risen to $370,600,000, a 289% increase.
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LmRARY O CONORESS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A SURVEY OF
ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS AND PROPOSED REmEDIs 7-8 (1975) [hereinafter cited as C.R.S.
REPORT], cited in Comment, The Constitutional Considerations of Medical Malpractice
Screening Panels, 27 AM. U. L. REv. 161, 161 n.2 (1977).
2. Note, The Florida Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975, 4 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 50,
50 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Florida Medical Malpractice].
3. See, e.g., Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 876, 555 P.2d 399, 416 (1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977) (existence of national medical malpractice insurance crisis
does not necessarily indicate that the problem pervades Idaho). See also Prendergast v.
Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977), where Justice White, dissenting in part, com-
mented:
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cal insurers in particularized locales have served to fuel such per-
ceptions. In Florida, for example, the Argonaut Insurance Com-
pany, which supplied group liability insurance for approximately
half of the state's physicians, raised its rates by an average of
ninety-six percent, effective January 1, 1975.1 By April, 1975, Argo-
naut sought a further ninety-five percent increase, arguing that its
insolvency was imminent and threatening to withdraw coverage al-
together.'
The reaction of the medical community to the insurance situa-
tion,' as well as general public concern over the increasing number
of malpractice claims filed against the providers of health care,'
focused both state' and national' attention upon the medical mal-
practice issue. In Florida, the impetus for remedial action came
from the Florida Medical Association, local medical societies and
individual practitioners. 0 Eventually, legislative response for medi-
I agree that it was within the power of the Legislature to determine that a
medical malpractice crisis exists although the record before us does not reflect the
existence of such a crisis. If there has been an explosion in malpractice claims,
the resulting inundation has not reached this court.
Id. at 127, 256 N.W.2d at 674.
4. Florida Medical Malpractice, supra note 2, at 51.
5. Id. Subsequently, however, a federal district court held that the company had failed
to establish either inadequate rates or insolvency, thus entitling intervening physicians to the
January, 1975 charges. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Florida Medical Ass'n, No. 75-140 (M.D. Fla.
May 19, 1975), cited in Florida Medical Malpractice, supra note 2, at 51 & n.6.
6. One of the more dramatic reactions occurred in northern California in May, 1975,
where a strike by anesthesiologists and surgeons eliminated all but emergency room surgery
in two-thirds of the hospitals. NEWSWEEK, June 9, 1975, at 58. In Florida, during that same
year, a spokesperson for the Dade County Medical Association announced that some 3,000
south Florida physicians were planning a work slowdown as a protest against the cost of
malpractice insurance. Florida Medical Malpractice, supra note 2, at 50 n.1. Other reactions
to the situation by Florida medical practitioners are noted in French, Florida Departs from
Tradition: The Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
423, 424 (1978).
7. In 1966, 18,200 medical malpractice cases were pending in the United States whereas
in 1970, 32,900 such cases were pending. This represents an eighty-one percent increase
during that four-year period. C.R.S. REPORT, supra note 1, at 7-8.
8. Tort reforms enacted by the states in response to the medical malpractice situation
have included limitations on liability statutes, changes in statutes of limitations and in-
formed consent statutes, elimination of the collateral source rule, codification of the locality
rule, modifications of standard of proof statutes, elimination of the ad damnum clause in
pleadings, and limitations on contingency fee sliding scales. HEALTH POLICY CENTER OF
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, A LEOISLATOR'S GUIDE TO THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ISSUE 9-11
(1976), cited in Comment, supra note 1, at 162 n.8.
9. See, e.g., CoNINUIO MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CRISIS, 1975: HEARINGS BEFORE
THE SUCOMM. ON HEALTH OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBuc WELFARE, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 SENATE HEARING ON MALPRACTICE]. For an earlier
federal investigation into the apparent increase in medical malpractice litigation, see SENATE
SUBCOMMrrrEE ON ExECuIVE REORGANIZATION, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
THE PATIENT VERSUS THE PHYSICIAN (1969).
10. Florida Medical Malpractice, supra note 2, at 57-58. The New York experience ap-
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cal malpractice reform culminated in the passage of the Medical
Malpractice Reform Act of 1975."
While the existence of a "crisis" seems to have been generally
accepted in 1975, substantial doubt has arisen since that time as to
the exact nature and scope of the problem. 2 A variety of legislative
committees on both the federal and state levels have expressed frus-
tration at the absence of reliable data which can be used to docu-
ment the existence of the alleged problem. 3 Nonetheless, even as-
suming that a medical malpractice insurance crisis did exist in 1975,
commentators now suggest that it has since abated." Thus, there is
controversy as to whether a genuine crisis did exist in Florida in the
mid-1970's. The focus of this article, however, will not discuss this
aspect, nor will any attempt be made to support the view that
deficiencies in Florida's Medical Malpractice Reform Act can be
explained "by the fact that the Act is a product of the desperate,
emotion-charged atmosphere which surrounded the medical mal-
practice issue during the 1975 legislative session."' 5 Rather, this
article will examine the constitutional validity of the medical me-
pears to have been similar. In Abrams v. Brooklyn Hosp., 91 Misc. 2d 380, 398 N.Y.S.2d 114
(Sup. Ct. 1977), the court remarked that New York's medical malpractice reform legislation,
which provides for mediation panels not unlike those of Florida, "was enacted by our legisla-
ture at the urging of the medical societies and the medical profession in general." 398
N.Y.S.2d at 115. See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 1977 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY 44 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT] (health care
providers have been instrumental in the passage of pre-trial review statutes).
11. FLA. STAT. §§ 768.44-.50 (1977).
12. See, e.g., Note, The Massachusetts Medical Malpractice Statute: A Constitutional
Perspective, 11 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1289, 1290 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Mass. Medical
Malpractice] (measuring magnitude and effect of malpractice problem in a particular local-
ity is difficult). See also note 3 supra.
13. See, e.g., Mass. Medical Malpractice, supra note 12, at 1291 n.6, (citing INTERIM
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISsION ESTABLISHED TO MAKE AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF
MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABIrrY INSURANCE AND THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE, MASS. H.R. REP. No. 4380, 18 (1976) ("no reliable data available" to assess
dimensions of malpractice problem); 1975 SENATE HEAUNG ON MALPRACTICE, supra note 9, at
'121 (statement by James F. Dickson, I, M.D., Acting Deputy Asst. Sec'y for Health) (one
difficulty in formulating solutions to malpractice problems is "absence of a solid base of
reliable data on which analysis can be undertaken").
14. See, e.g., ABA REPORT, supra note 10. That report states:
When the [ABA] Commission was established in February, 1975, a crisis in
the delivery of medical care seemed imminent because of the unavailability of
liability insurance at a cost which was acceptable to highrisk providers. Now, a
little more than two years later, the medical malpractice crisis seems to have
abated, and much of the attention to such problems has shifted to products
liability, legal malpractice and municipal liability.
Id. at 9. For a Florida commentator who agrees that the crisis has waned, see French, supra
note 6, at 440.
15. Florida Medical Malpractice, supra note 2, at 103.
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diation panels provided for by the Act, an inquiry which suggests
that medical malpractice plaintiffs are deprived of an opportunity
for a fair hearing of their claims.
If. THE STATUTORY SCHEME
Although the scope of the Malpractice Reform Act is broad," a
predominant feature of the legislation is the establishment of me-
diation panels which operate as a screening mechanism for medical
malpractice claims. The Act requires a plaintiff to submit any mal-
practice claim to the panel before that claim can be filed in any
state court." The claim, which is to be made on a form provided by
the circuit court, must be filed initially with the clerk of that court,
with service of process effected as provided by law." All parties
named as defendants in the claim must file an answer within twenty
days of the date of service, and no further pleadings are allowed.'9
If no answer is filed, the mediation panel's jurisdiction is terminated
and the plaintiff may proceed with a lawsuit."0
The three-member mediation panel is composed of a judicial
referee, who is the presiding member, a licensed physician and an
attorney.2' The judicial referee, who must be a circuit judge, is ap-
pointed by an unspecified "blind" system.22 The physician is se-
lected from a list of licensed practitioners, the list being prepared
by the chief judge of each judicial circuit.23 In making the list, the
chief judge is authorized to accept the recommendations of
"recognized professional medical societies," and the list is, if possi-
16. The Act embodies three general approaches to reform in the medical malpractice
area. First, it attempts to assure the availability of medical liability insurance coverage by
the pooling of risks by insurance carriers. Second, the Act aims to protect patients through
provisions which are designed to identify and discipline incompetent or negligent physicians.
Third, the Act modifies judicial handling of malpractice claims by establishing mediation
panels and by altering the awarding of damages by juries. For a brief overview of all aspects
of the Act, see French, supra note 6.
17. The pertinent provision is as follows:
Any person or his representative claiming damages by reason of injury, death, or
monetary loss on account of alleged malpractice by any medical or osteopathic
physician, podiatrist, hospital or health maintenance organization against whom
he believes there is a reasonable basis for a claim shall submit such claim to an
appropriate medical liability mediation panel before that claim may be filed in
any court of this state.
FiA. STAT. § 768.44 (1)(a) (1977).
18. Id. § 768.44(1)(b).
19. Id. § 768.44(1)(c).
20. Id.
21. Id. § 768.44(2).
22. Id.
23. Id. § 768.44(2)(a).
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ble, to be divided according to medical specialties.24 A list of quali-
fied attorneys is also to be prepared by the chief judge, who is
authorized to accept the recommendation of "recognized profes-
sional legal societies." 5 No provision is made for limiting the attor-
neys so qualified to those with expertise in medical malpractice law.
A physician or an attorney selected to be on a particular hearing
panel may disqualify himself or may be challenged for cause. 6 The
plaintiff is responsible for a filing fee not to exceed twenty-five
dollars to defray incidental expenses incurred by the panel.27 In
addition, each nonjudicial panelist is to be paid $100.00 for expenses
for each day or partial day spent on the mediation panel. These
expenses are to be assessed equally to both parties by the court.2 8
Within thirty days after service of process, the parties are to file
with the clerk a document designating the type of medical specialist
who should be on their panel. In the event that the parties are
unable to agree on the specialty to be represented, the determina-
tion is made by the judicial referee. 6 If the parties are able to agree
on a particular attorney or physician to sit on the mediation panel,
they may so stipulate. 0 In the absence of an agreement, the clerk is
to 'mail the parties the names of five attorneys and five physicians
of the designated specialty, selected at random from the mediation
panel lists. In the event that it is impractical to designate a spe-
cialty, the five physicians are to be randomly selected without re-
gard to specialty. 3' The potential panel members have ten days to
disqualify themselves, and the parties have the same period of time
in which to challenge them for cause. Decisions or challenges for
cause are to be made by agreement or by the judicial referee. 3 In
the event of disqualifications or challenges, additional panel mem-
bers are to be added to the list of five, as required. 33 Thereafter, the
parties are to agree on one attorney and one physician from the lists.
In the event that no agreement can be reached, "each side shall then
strike names alternately from the attorneys' list and from the physi-
cians' list separately, with the claimant striking first, until each side
24. Id.
25. Id. § 768.44(2)(b).
26. Id. § 768.44(2)(d).
27. Id. § 768.44(2)(e).
28. Id. § 768.44(2)(i).
29. Id. § 768.44(2)(f).
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has stricken two names from each list. The remaining attorney and
physician shall serve on the hearing panel."'
Once the panel members have been selected, "the judicial ref-
eree and either party may question the physician and attorney to
determine if either of them has a state of mind regarding the subject
matter at issue, the case at hand, or any parties. . . involved...,
that will prevent him from acting with impartiality."35 If the judicial
referee determines that the panelist cannot serve impartially, he is
removed."6
The panel must hold its hearing within 120 days of the date of
the filing of the claim, unless the time is extended for good cause.
In any event, the extension is not to exceed six months from the date
of the filing of the claim. 7 If no hearing is held within ten months
of the filing of the claim, the jurisdiction of the panel terminates and
the parties are free to proceed in accordance with the law. 8
The parties to the mediation panel are permitted to utilize any
discovery procedure provided by the Florida Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. The judicial referee has discretion, however, to make reasona-
ble limitations in the scope of such discovery." The claim must be
submitted to the panel in accordance with the Florida Rules 'of
Medical Mediation Procedure,'" but "strict adherence to the rules
of procedure and evidence applicable in civil cases" is not required."
Witnesses may be called and their testimony taken under oath,
either orally or by deposition. Copies of records, x-rays and other
documents may be presented to, and considered by, the panel. The
right to subpoena witnesses and records applies as in other proceed-
ings in the circuit court.'" The right of cross-examination obtains as
to those witnesses who testify in person.' 3 Each party is entitled to
make an opening and closing statement."
While no transcript or record of the proceedings is required,
either party may have the proceedings transcribed or recorded."
The judicial referee presiding at the hearing is not permitted to
34. Id.
35. Id. § 768.44(2)(h).
36. Id.
37. Id. § 768.44(3).
38. Id.
39. Id. § 768.44(5).
40. In re The Florida Bar, 348 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1977).







preside at any trial subsequently arising out of the claim, nor is any
other panel member permitted to participate in such a trial, either
as counsel or as witness."
Within thirty days after the completion of a hearing, the panel
is required to file a written decision only on the issue of liability,
stating its conclusion in words substantially conforming to the
statutory language." Any panel member is permitted to file a
written concurring or dissenting opinion.4 8 After a finding of liabil-
ity, if the adverse parties agree, the panel may continue mediation
with a view to assisting the parties in reaching a settlement. In
such an event, the panel is to make a recommendation as to a
reasonable range of damages. 9
In the event that either party rejects the finding of the media-
tion panel, the claimant may commence litigation based upon his
claimY' The conclusion of the mediation panel as to the issue of
liability is admissible, however, in any subsequent trial, although
any specific findings of fact made by the panel are not admissible.5
The parties may comment on the panel's conclusion in their opening
statements and in their arguments to the court or jury.2 In the event
of a non-unanimous panel finding, the numerical vote is admissi-
ble.u The jury is to be instructed that the mediation panel's conclu-
sion is not binding but is to be given the weight they choose to
ascribe to it. Panel members may not, moreover, be called to testify
as to the merits of the case.54 As has been noted, panel members may
not participate in a subsequent trial in any manner.55 The statute
thus prevents either party from calling a panelist to testify as to the
manner in which the panel's conclusion was reached.
III. JUDICIAL VALIDATION IN Carter v. Sparkman
The Florida Medical Malpractice Reform Act has spawned a
46. Id.
47. Id. § 768.44(7). The pertinent language of this section is as follows:
8(a) "We find the defendant was actionably negligent in his care or treat-
ment of the patient and we, therefore, find for the plaintiff"; or
(b) "We find the defendant was not actionably negligent in his care or
treatment of the patient and we, therefore, find for the defendant."
48. Id.
49. Id. § 768.44(8).
50. Id. § 768.47(1).




55. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
1979]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
great deal of litigation in its brief history, most of which is due to
uncertainty in the meaning of key provisions. Courts have disa-
greed, for example, on whether the ten month jurisdictional period
may be extended under any circumstances." Controversy also exists
as to the time within which a mediation panel hearing must be
commenced.57 1i addition, parties have raised other questions re-
garding procedures under the Act.58
56. See, e.g., Aldana v. Holub, 354 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), wherein the court,
in determining that the 10-month period cannot be extended for any reason by the judicial
referee, noted that a "clear conflict between the decisions of the Second and Third District
Courts of Appeal and those of the Fourth District Court of Appeal" exist regarding this
issue. Id. at 1273. More specifically, in at least three instances the Second and Third District
Courts of Appeal extended the time limits described in § 768.44(3) because the mediation
process was suspended pending determination by the Supreme Court of Florida as to the
constitutionality of the review panels. See State ex rel. Lund v. Keough, 352 So. 2d 572 (Fla.
2d DCA 1977); State ex rel. McGuirk v. Cowart, 344 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); State ex
rel. Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Vann, 342 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). In addition, the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, held that where a claimant's failure to follow proper proce-
dures in timely fashion was inadvertent, a subsequent court action could be stayed pending
a medical mediation proceeding. Richards v. Foulk, 345 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
At other times, however, § 768.44(3) has been construed more rigidly, particularly by the
District Court of Appeal, Fourth District. See, e.g., Ludwig v. Glover, 357 So. 2d 233 (Fla.
let DCA 1978) (order of judicial referee purportedly terminating jurisdiction of mediation
panel does not operate to extend the 10-month jurisdictional period); Kirschgessner v. Miami
Int'l Hosp., 356 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (statutory 10-month period for holding of
medical mediation procedure hearing requires that final hearing on the merits be concluded
within the 10-month period); Cole v. Wallace, 354 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (jurisdic-
tion of medical mediation panel terminates as a matter of law at expiration of 10-month
period and issuance of unauthorized order by judicial referee in no way mitigates such expira-
tion); Perkins v. Pare, 352 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (failure to observe the 10-month
period results in automatic cessation of the jurisdiction of the medical mediation panel);
Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Badia, 348 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 3d DCA.1977) (no extension of 120-day period
as statute must be strictly construed since it places an impediment on a plaintiff's right to
seek legal redress). Accord, Scherer v. Liberto, 353 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (20-day
period in which to answer is jurisdictional and failure to file timely prevents defendant from
receiving benefits of medical mediation proceedings).
57. In the District Courts of Appeal, Second and Fourth Districts, if no hearing is com-
menced within six months from the date the claim was filed, the panel loses jurisdiction and
the claimant may avail himself of his common law rights. Raedel v. Watson Clinic Founda-
tion, Inc., 360 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Stanton v. Community Hosp., 359 So. 2d 37
(Fla. 4th DCA 1978); see FLA. R. MED. P. 20.190(c). In the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, it is arguable that a full 10 months exists in which to commence a hearing, notwith-
standing rule 20.190. State ex rel. Love v. Jacobson, 343 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert.
denied, 352 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1977). It should be noted, however, that the decision in Love was
handed down prior to the effective date of rule 20.190(c).
58. See, e.g., Fisher v. Herrera, 367 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1978), where the Supreme Court of
Florida concluded that a plaintiff is not required to present evidence in support of his claim
at the mediation hearing as a condition precedent to a right to sue. The Fisher court also
stated that the panel may only reach a single finding of either actionable negligence or no
actionable negligence, and therefore the phrase "because the claimants chose not to present
any evidence" may not be used to qualify a finding in favor of the defendant.
[Vol. 33:1155
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When challenged on constitutional grounds, the Act was upheld
by the Supreme Court of Florida in Carter v. Sparkman." In Carter,
the court limited its construction of the Act *to a resolution of the
equal protection issue raised by the plaintiff. 0 The court noted that
emphasis has been placed on the contention that a physician has
the "best of two worlds" in that, unlike the claimant, he has a choice
between participating or not participating in the mediation panel
proceeding. If both parties participate in the proceeding, the plain-
tiff accurately pointed out that the result is admissible at a subse-
quent trial, yet the statute is silent as to the admissibility of a
physician's nonparticipation.6 ' The court agreed that such an
arrangement would violate the equal protection clause of both the
Florida and United States Constitutions and accordingly construed
the Act to mean that a physician's failure to participate in the
mediation panel proceedings is admissible at a subsequent trial."2
The court in Carter gave only passing attention to the plaintiff's
due process argument that the Act restricted her access to the
courts. It noted the crisis atmosphere in which the legislature had
acted and found that the Act constituted a legitimate exercise of
state police power because it attempted to reduce the cost of medi-
cal malpractice insurance and ultimately the cost of medical serv-
ices. 3 Therefore, despite the fact that this prelitigation burden im-
posed on the claimant "reaches the outer limits of constitutional
tolerance," the court refused to strike down the Act as unconstitu-
tional.e
The Carter decision has not received favorable commentary.65
Even Justice England, in concurring with the majority, found it
In Koota v. Parkway Gen. Hosp., Inc., 346 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), the question
of whether a party can be ordered to participate in the selection of mediation panel members
was raised. The court remanded the case, holding that the judicial referee had no authority
to certify the question to the district court of appeal. Other procedural issues were raised in
Drs. Howarth & Scott, P.A. v. Edwards, 353 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (circuit judge
sitting as judicial referee had no authority to grant summary judgment) and in Floyd v. Goss,
352 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (judicial referee has no authority to enter judgment on
the pleadings).
59. 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
60. Id. at 805.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 806.
64. Id.
65. As one commentator has pointed out, the court's failure to give attention to each
argument in Carter substantially reduces the value of its opinion. Comment, Testing the
Constitutionality of Medical Malpractice Legislation: The Wisconsin Medical Malpractice
Act of 1975, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 838, 855 [hereinafter cited as Wisconsin Medical Malpractice].
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necessary to analyze in greater detail the arguments raised against
the validity of the Act.66 Consequently, as the remainder of this
article examines the constitutional shortcomings of the Florida
Medical Malpractice Reform Act, particular emphasis will be
placed on those contentions which the court in Carter left unad-
dressed.
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION
The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States declares that no state shall "deny to any person . . . the
equal protection of the laws."67 The Supreme Court of the United
States has interpreted this clause to mean that all persons "should
have like access to the courts of the country for the protection of
their persons and property, [and] the prevention and redress of
wrongs . ".. . " In the instant case, the malpractice claimant is
clearly receiving different treatment than the regular tort claimant,
due to the Medical Malpractice Reform Act, in that he is forced to
go through the additional burden of medical mediation." The issue
in this context is whether the classification serves to deny to mal-
practice claimants the equal protection of the laws.
Traditionally, courts have utilized an equal protection analysis
66. 335 So. 2d at 807-09. According to Justice England, the plaintiff argued that the Act
violated both the privileges and immunities clause and the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States because her "privilege" to se-
lect a judicial forum, rather than a mediation panel had been denied. Id. at 807. The plain-
tiff also argued that she was denied liberty without due process of law because of the neces-
sity of review of malpractice suits before civil litigation can be commenced in a court of law.
Id. Furthermore, the plaintiff argued that she was denied access to the courts in violation
of article I, section 21 of the Constitution of the State of Florida. Id. at 807-08. In addition,
she raised the contention that judges may not serve on mediation panels by reason of article
V, section 13 of the Constitution of the State of Florida directing that judges shall devote
their full time to their judicial responsibilities. Id. at 808. Finally, it was argued that the
rules of procedure set out in the statute violate the provision of the state constitution direct-
ing the supreme court to formulate such rules. Id. at 808-09.
67. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
68. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1884). But see Cohen v. Beneficial Idus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 552 (1949).
69. In addition to the burden of time, energy and money, medical malpractice claimants
suffer disadvantages in the civil litigation process itself. As a commentator on the Massachu-
setts mediation panel legislation has noted:
By compelling the claimant in an action for medical negligence to demonstrate
the validity of his case prior to trial, the legislation bestows a corresponding
advantage on the defendant health-care provider, granting him a type of statutory
shield against the traditional judicial process in civil litigation. The unequal
treatment resulting from this classification violates traditional concepts of equal
protection.
Mass. Medical Malpractice, supra note 12, at 1296 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 33:1155
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which consists of a two-tier approach.' The first tier, the so called
"rational basis" test, holds that a state may classify and thus may
discriminate if there is a rational relationship between the means
chosen and a legitimate state objective.7' Under this test, the mere
existence of discrimination does not in and of itself violate equal
protection.
7 2
The second level of analysis, strict scrutiny, comes into play
when a fundamental right 3 or a "'suspect classification"7' is af-
fected. In these instances, the court will strictly scrutinize the statu-
tory classification. The classification will be struck down unless it
can be justified by a compelling state interest, and the court will,
nevertheless, examine the means employed in the legislation to see
if a less restrictive alternative exists which could otherwise accom-
plish the state objective.7"
Given the rigidity of this "either/or" approach, the Supreme
Court has developed a new level of equal protection analysis, falling
between the existing liberal and strict standards. This
"intermediate scrutiny" focuses on the relationship between the
subject legislation and the purpose to be served by that legislation."
70. For a discussion of the "rational basis" and "strict scrutiny" levels of analysis, see
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See generally Gunther, Foreward: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L.
REV. 1 (1972).
71. See, e.g., Lindsley v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
72. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970). Futhermore, "the reform may take
one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to
the legislative mind. . . . The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a
remedy there, neglecting the others." Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955)
(citation omitted).
73. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 133 (1973) (right to privacy); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (right to travel); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 499 (1958) (freedom of association).
74. See, e.g., Loving v. Viriginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (racial classifications as a suspect
classification which demand the "most rigid scrutiny").
75. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (no compelling state interest);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (compelling state interest and no less
restrictive alternative).
In point of fact, the strict scrutiny test is conclusory. In all but one instance, when this
level of analysis was used, the Court has struck down the classification. The sole exception
was Korematsu, which occurred during wartime and which evoked a strong dissent.
76. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Jones v.
State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
Justice Marshall, the most forceful advocate of the intermediate scrutiny test, set forth
the justification for this test in his dissent in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). He strongly disagreed with the attempt to categorize all equal
protection cases as falling "into one of two neat categories which dictate the appropriate
standard of review .... Id. at 98. Instead, the Court should apply a spectrum of standards,
depending on the value of the interest involved. "As the nexus between the specific constitu-
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While not requiring a compelling state interest as in strict scrutiny
analysis, the objective served by the challenged statute must further
an "important" or "substantial" governmental goal. Furthermore,
the classification must be "substantially related" to the achieve-
ment of that important goal. Intermediate scrutiny has been trig-
gered when important, although not necessarily fundamental, rights
are at stake" and when sensitive, although not necessarily suspect,
classifications are employed.78
Ohio courts have, in the area of medical mediation, used the
strict scrutiny standard and have required a showing of a compelling
state interest in order to uphold their medical mediation statute. 79
One court reviewed an Ohio statutory requirement that any com-
plaint setting forth a medical claim list all benefits, of any kind,
payable to the plaintiff as a result of the incident giving rise to the
claim. By the requirement that such collateral benefits be listed
only in medical claims, the court noted, the legislature had ordained
differential treatment for claimants in one particular type of tort
action while conferring benefits on the medical malpractice defen-
dant not available to other defendants in tort actions. The court
concluded:
There is no satisfactory reason for this separate and unequal
treatment. There obviously is "no compelling governmental in-
terest" unless it be argued that any segment of the public in
financial distress be at least partly relieved of financial accounta-
bility for its negligence. To articulate the requirement is to dem-
onstrate its absurdity, for at one time or another every type of
profession or business undergoes difficult times, and it is not the
business of government to manipulate the law so as to provide
succor to one class, the medical, by depriving another, the mal-
practiced patients, of the equal protection mandated by the con-
stitution."
tional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional inter-
est becomes more fundamental and the degree of judicial scrutiny applied . . .must be
adjusted accordingly." Id. at 102-03.
77. E.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S.
441 (1973); see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1089-90 (1978).
78. E.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). See L. TRIBE, supra note 77, at
1090.
79. Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (C.P. 1976).
80. Id. at 320, 343 N.E.2d at 837. See also Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio
Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (C.P. 1976), where the court agreed with the holding in Graley
that the Ohio Medical Malpractice Act denied plaintiffs equal protection. The court found
nothing to add to the analysis in Graley, and therefore applied it to the compulsory arbitra-
tion provisions of the Ohio Act.
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Thus, at least one jurisdiction has required the showing of a
compelling state interest to uphold legislation similar to Florida's
Medical Malpractice Reform Act.' In addition, a number of courts
have applied the intermediate scrutiny analysis to malpractice re-
form statutes. In Jones v. State Board of Medicine,"2 for example,
the Supreme Court of Idaho noted the new standard of equal protec-
tion analysis, focusing upon the relationship between the subject
legislation and the object or purpose to be served by that legislation.
The court stated that this "new intermediate standard of equal
protection review has been described as 'means-focus' because it
tests whether the legislative means substantially furthers some spe-
cifically identifiable legislative end." 3 The court pointed out that
this intermediate test has been applied only in cases where the
discriminatory nature of a challenged statutory classification is ap-
parent on its face and where there is also a patent indication of a
lack of relationship between the classification and the declared pur-
pose of the statute .
8
In Jones, the court found that the Idaho Hospital-Medical Lia-
bility Act" created a discriminatory classification which conferred
an advantage on doctors and hospitals at the expense of the more
seriously injured and damaged victims.8 The court examined the
purposes of the Idaho Act and the relationship of the Act to those
purposes and concluded that there was no factual basis on the re-
cord for understanding the nature and scope of the alleged malprac-
tice insurance crisis, which had been raised as the Act's underlying
purpose.8"
In Carter v. Sparkman, 8 the Supreme Court of Florida em-
ployed the rational basis standard to hold the statutory classifica-
81. But see Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 App. Div. 2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1976), where the
court rejected the argument, that access to the courts was a fundamental right, basing its
decision on United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
It is submitted, however, that if access to courts is a fundamental value under a substan-
tive due process analysis, then access to courts should be a fundamental right under equal
protection analysis. See notes 111-115 and accompanying text infra.
82. 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976).
83. Id. at 867, 555 P.2d at 407.
84. Id. The court applied the intermediate standard of review and remanded to find a
statewide concern, whether there is a health and welfare benefit and whether adoption of the
act is reasonably related to solution of the problem. Id. at 871, 555 P.2d at 417.
85. IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4201 to -4213 (1978).
86. 97 Idaho at 871, 555 P.2d at 417.
87. Under the intermediate test employed in Jones, the court will inquire as to whether
a crisis in fact exists. Under the more traditional standard, the court simply accepts the
legislative finding of a crisis. See Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice
Insurance Crises: Constitutional Implications, 55 TEx. L. REv. 759, 769 (1977).
88. 335 So. 2d at 902.
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tion of the Medical Malpractice Reform Act a valid exercise of the
state's police power."' The court stated that although it "reaches the
outer limits of constitutional tolerance,"' 0 the screening panel is a
valid attempt by the legislature to remedy "medical malpractice"
and it has the permissible purpose of protecting the health and
welfare of the citizens of Florida." Furthermore, the panel was cre-
ated at a time when Florida citizens were threatened with a drastic
reduction in the availability of medical care because of the high cost
of malpractice insurance."
According to Carter, the legislature sought to remove patently
frivolous and unmeritorious cases from the courts, thereby reducing
the cost to the insurers." There was thus a rational relationship
between the legislation and the legitimate goal of ensuring the avail-
ability of medical care for all citizens, and this made the increased
cost to claimants who proceed to trial insufficient to invalidate the
legislation."
While states have broad discretion in exercising their police
powers in a manner that tends to restrict access to the courts, 5
neither the strict scrutiny nor the intermediate scrutiny standards
can be lightly dismissed when the constitutionality of medical mal-
practice "reform" legislation is challenged on equal protection
grounds. There is convincing precedent for the use of either level of
scrutiny.
Even when the rational basis test is employed, substantial
questions are raised as to the constitutionality of the Medical Mal-
practice Reform Act due to the change in circumstances between
1975 and the present. Using the rational basis test, courts have
generally upheld such legislation as a legitimate response to the
legislative objective of preventing a decline in the availability and
quality of health care as a result of the malpractice insurance
"crisis."" Whatever validity this rationale may have had in the
89. Id. at 805.
90. Id. at 806.
91. Id. at 805-06; accord, Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977).
92. 335 So. 2d at 805. Courts in other jurisdictions have also dismissed equal protection
challenges to medical mediation statutes using the "crisis" as a justification. They have
applied the "traditional" equal protection test, under which a classification is permissible if
it has a rational basis.
93. 335 So. 2d at 806.
94. Id. at 807-08 (England, J. concurring).
95. See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Hardware
Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151 (1931); Jones v. Union Guano Co.,
264 U.S. 171 (1924).




emotion-charged atmosphere of 1975, a reexamination in light of
present conditions demonstrates that the "crisis," if it ever existed,
is past. 7 Thus, the rational relationship between this legislation and
the state objective is, at best, questionable." At a time when the
medical profession has responded to this "crisis" by amassing more
than sufficient funds to insure itself, it can no longer~be claimed that
there is a legitimate purpose to be served by confdrring benefits on
the medical profession at the expense of malpractice claimants." An
objective assessment under even the loosest standard discloses that
the legislative objective for the Act has disappeared.
V. DUE PROCESS
A. Substantive Due Process
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires
that the state legislature exercise its police power in a nonarbitrary
manner and that the laws bear a reasonable relationship to a legiti-
mate objective.' ® While the doctrine of substantive due process has
been rejected in the economic sphere,' °' in that it is beyond the
scope of the judiciary to substitute its own judgment for that of the
legislature, the Supreme Court of the United States has been
reluctant to defer to legislative judgment when there are funda-
mental values at issue.' 2 Thus, the amount of substance given to a
due process analysis is reflective of the value placed on the interest
involved.
97. See notes 12-14 and accompanying text supra.
98. While a classification need not be drawn with "precise mathematical nicety," it must
bear at least a rational relationship to a legitimate state objective. See Department of Agricul-
ture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (striking down provision of food stamp program as
"wholly without any rational basis").
99. The fading of the malpractice insurance "crisis" also exposes the Florida Act to
challenge on special legislation grounds. In Butler v. Flint-Goodridge Hosp. of Dillard Univ.,
354 So. 2d 1070 (La. App. 1978), the court noted that a constitutional challenge to a statute
on the grounds that it confers special benefits on a given class-and thus constitutes special
legislation-is closely related to the equal protection challenge. In BUtler, the court remarked
that "we are not delighted by the prospect of unusual procedures or unusual protections
being accorded to any specified group, be they health care providers or not." Id. at 1074.
Notwithstanding its concern, the court dismissed'the special legislation challenge, deferring
to the legislatively perceived need to keep health care services flowing. Again, in the absence
of such a justification, the conferring of special benefits upon physicians and health care pro-
viders becomes constitutionally intolerable.
100. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). Justice Harlan, in delivering the opinion of
the Court, stated that not "every statute enacted ostensibly for the promotion of [public
health] is to be accepted as a legitimate exertion of the police powers of the state." Id. at
661.
101. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v.
Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
102. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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In Carter v. Sparkman, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed
the lower court which had held that the Medical Malpractice Re-
form Act restrained the plaintiff from timely access to the courts in
violation of article I, section 21 of the Constitution of the State of
Florida. 03 The majority opinion stated that "although courts are
generally opposed to any burden being placed on the rights of ag-
grieved persons'to enter the courts because of the constitutional
guarantee of access, there may be reasonable restrictions pre-
scribed by law,"'0 4 particularly when the state concern of public
health and welfare is involved. 05 The Carter court held that the
Act is not void because it deals with matters directly related to
public health and has as its purpose an effort to mediate malprac-
tice claims, thereby reducing medical malpractice insurance and
ultimately medical expenses. 10
Further examination, however, leads to the conclusion that the
restrictions on access to the courts imposed by the Act merit more
concern than was given by the court in Carter. The Supreme Court
of Missouri has held that the Missouri Professional Liability Review
Board Act,'07 which requires that medical malpractice claims be
referred to a board for a hearing and recommendations prior to filing
a court actio~n, violates Missouri's state constitutional guarantee of
access to the courts.'0 The court distinguished a New York case,
Comiskey v. Arlen, ' which held that a statute providing for a medi-
cal malpractice panel did not deny the fundamental right of access
to the courts on the basis that the New York screening panel is
convened after the court proceedings are commenced."10
In light of earlier decisions by the Supreme Court of Florida,
the right of access to the courts must be viewed as a fundamental
value which cannot be denied by the legislature. In Kluger v.
103. 335 So. 2d at 802.
104. Id. at 805. Examples of such restrictions cited by the court are statute of limitations,
payment of reasonable court deposits, pursuit of certain administrative relief, or requirements
that newspapers have an opportunity to retract before a libel action may be filed. Id.
105. Id.; accord, Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978); Comiskey v. Arlen, 55
App. Div. 2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1976). The court in Comiskey rejected a substantive due
process attack based on access to courts stating that, "where a statute is challei.ged on
nonprocedural grounds as violative of due process of law we have consistently asked the
question whether there is 'some fair, just and reasonable connection' between it and the
promotion of the health, comfort, safety and welfare of society." Id. at 310, 390 N.Y.S.2d at
128, (quoting Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 54, 340 N.E.2d 444, 451, 378 N.Y.S.2d
1, 11 (1975)).
106. 335 So. 2d at 806.
107. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 538.010-.080 (Vernon Supp. 1979).
108. State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Hosp. for Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107
(Mo. 1979) (en banc).
109. 55 App. Div. 2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1976).
110. Accord, Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d at 807 (England, J., concurring).
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White, " for example, the supreme court construed article I, section
21 of the Constitution of the State of Florida to mean that the legis-
lature is without power to abolish a right of access to the courts
without providing some reasonable alternative to protect a plain-
tiff's right to redress unless the legislature can show an overpower-
ing public necessity for the abolishment of such right and no alter-
native method for meeting such necessity can be shown."' The
holding in Kluger raises questions of whether the Medical Mal-
practice Reform Act has, in effect, abolished a malpractice claim-
ant's right to proceed in court by forcing him to mediate his claim
first," '3 whether the mediation procedure provides a reasonable
alternative to a civil action"' and whether no other method for deal-
ing with the alleged malpractice insurance "crisis" can be shown."5
The two features of the Florida Act which raise the access prob-
lem are the time and expense consumed by the mediation panel
111. 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
112. Id. at 4.
113. Although Kluger involved an express abolition of a tort action, the case may stand
for the proposition that a "practical" as well as an actual abolition of a cause of action is
unconstitutional. Cf. North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276 (1925) (state statute
providing for notice and opportunity to be heard in a proceeding for a proposed establishment
of a road not violative of the Constitution of the United States unless it is a denial of funda-
mental rights of citizens in its practical effect). It should be noted here that this is not a
procedural due process argument in that it is unfair to force a medical malpractice plaintiff
burdens, but that the cost and delay involved in mediation arbitrarily prohibits plaintiff's
right to proceed to trial. For a procedural due process argument, see notes 142-50 and accom-
panying text infra.
114. It may be argued that the mediation procedure is not a reasonable alternative to a
civil action. Long delays between filing and final disposition result in unreasonable delays
for compensation of valid claims. Problems may exist in obtaining medical experts to assist
in case preparation and testifying. Mediation also constributes to high costs for case prepara-
tion, including expert fees. See Note, Medical-Legal Screening Panels as an Alternative
Approach to Medical Malpractice Claims, 13 WM. & MARY L. REv. 695, 709-10 (1972).
115. See, e.g., Note, Malicious Prosecution: An Effective Attack On Spurious Medical
Malpractice Claims?, 26 CAsE W. Rzs. L. REv. 653 (1976). Another alternative to full blown
mediation may be the establishment of a pretrial screening procedure. This would consist of
a minihearing, not to determine the merits of the case, but to determine if the case is
meritorious and should proceed to trial or if the case is clearly spurious and should be
dismissed. The time and delay of a full evidentiary hearing as well as the danger of prejudic-
ing the jury with a finding on the merits will be eliminated. Fairness mandates that the judge
who conducts this minihearing should not be the judge which conducts the full trial. But cf.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), where the Court stated that there was
"nothing in either the language or the history of rule 23 'that gave a court the authority' to
conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it could
be maintained as a class action." Id. at 177. The Court noted that such a preliminary
minihearing may result in substantial prejudice to a defendant as it is not accompanied by
traditional procedural safeguards and could color the subsequent proceedings. Id. at 178, This
case, however, is clearly distinguishable from the issue at bar in that the decision was based
solely on statutory interpretation-rule 23-and did not involve constitutional interpretation.
19791
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
proceeding. These problems are compounded by the fact that the
panel's findings are admissible at a subsequent trial."' Thus, the
claimant is forced to incur substantial costs and to spend up to ten
months in the prelitigation stage. That the panel proceeding is time
consuming is well illustrated by the volume of litigation involving
the availability,:pf extensions of the statutory time limits."7
Aside from the fact that the plaintiff must wait tip to ten
months to obtain, access to the courts and to pursue relief through
litigation, that Act imposes substantial costs. The Act allows exten-
sive discovery, and both oral and documentary evidence may be
introduced at the hearing."' Clearly, the claimant who hopes to
avoid the nearly insurmountable burden of a negative finding must
utilize these tools fully. He is, in effect, put to the expense of two
full trials."'
Nor are the plaintiff's additional expenses limited to those re-
quired for the development of his evidence. The plaintiff is solely
responsible for a filing fee to defray the mediation panel's
"incidental expenses."'' 0 In addition, each nonjudicial panelist
earns one hundred dollars a day for each day or partial day spent
serving on the panel.'' The Act says only that the court shall assess
both parties equally for the payment of such expenses.'22 It does not
specify whether the assessing court is the circuit court, which ad-
116. The American Bar Association's Commission on Medical Professional Liability has
questioned the value of a panel whose findings are admissible at a later trial, noting that
"much of the settlement value of a more informal, insulated procedure may be lost, and the
panel may become a costly and time-consuming 'minitrial."' ABA REPoRT, supra note 10, at
47.
117. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
118. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(5)-(6) (1977).
119. See Harlan, Virginia's New Medical Malpractice Review Panel and Some Questions
it Raised, 11 U. RIcH. L. REv. 51 (1976), in which it is observed that the Virginia panel "seems
to be more than a 'screening panel.' Because of the far reaching consequences of its opinion,
coupled with the high cost of utilizing the panel, the effect may be to chill the ardor of those
persons contemplating using it." Id. at 68. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)
(filing fee for divorce proceedings unconstitutional as a restriction on access to courts for
indigent claimants). But see Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) and United States v.
Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973), where the Court made it clear that not every financial impediment
restricting access to the courts was sufficient to invalidate the law; it must be shown that "a
fundamental interest . . . is gained or lost depending on the availability" of the relief sought
by appellants. Id. at 445. See also Mass. Medical Malpractice, supra note 12, at 1317, .where
the author notes that because the Massachusetts malpractice screening panel statute
"provides no aid to the malpractice victim in exchange for his additional expense and delay,
the tribunal process is an inadequate and unreasonable substitute for traditional trial proce-
dure." Id.
120. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(2)(e) (1977).




ministers the mediation panel, or the court which subsequently
hears the plaintiff's claim if he rejects the panel's finding. The possi-
bility thus arises that the plaintiff who does elect to pursue his claim
in civil litigation may, as a prerequisite, be required to pay his share
of the panelists' expenses."
In terms of additional expense and delay, then;, a medical mal-
practice plaintiff's access to the courts has been substantially
impeded by the Act. Moreover, the entire mediation panel proce-
dure is likely to result in a disincentive to the plaintiff to pursue
further relief. Statistics indicate that panels predominantly favor
defendants and that plaintiffs saddled with negative findings are
extremely unlikely to continue on to court."' A negative panel find-
ing, therefore, not only deprives a plaintiff of a fair hearing, but also
has the effect of dissuading him from seeking such a trial at all and,
thus, effectively denies him access to the courts.""
Although access to state civil court proceedings is primarily an
issue of state concern and state legislatures have great latitude in
formulating their own procedures for access to their courts," a state
may not completely abolish access for a particular cause of action.2 7
Medical mediation statutes may be valid exercises of the state's
police power in the area of public health and welfare, but such
power is not without limit. The state interest of providing adequate
health care by lowering malpractice premiums must be weighed
against the burdens imposed by the Act on a claimant's ability to
seek access to the courts to redress alleged injuries. However strong
the state interest may have been in 1975, at the time of the alleged
123. The court in Carter glossed over the problem raised by the Act's expense provisions,
remarking that while "[w]e realize that certain items of expense in relation to the mediation
attempts will be incurred, . . . it would naturally follow.that such expenses to the extent of
reasonableness would become a part of the costs of the judicial proceedings, taxable against
the losing party." 335 So. 2d at 805. Justice England, in his concurring opinion, expressed
concern over the Act's harshness in submitting plaintiffs to additional expense. His concerns,
however, were "assuaged by the Court's determination that expenses incurred in the media-
tion panel proceeding, including the expert witness fees and travel'expenses which are so
costly in this type of litigation, are to be taxable costs on later trial if the plaintiff prevails."
Id. at 808, n.5.
The Act, of course, makes no such provision. The court has simply sought to save the
constitutionality of the Act by reading these provisions into it. Indeed, in the case of the
panelists' expenses, the Act expressly provides that the costs are to be split between the
parties, rather than being taxed against the losing party. The court's construction, then, is
totally unfounded.
124. See notes 161-169 and accom panying text infra.
125. See Harlan, supra note 119, at 69.
126. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 551-52 (1949).
127. See notes 111-115 and accompanying text supra.
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crisis, 2 ' it is clear that the crisis has now passed and the substantial
obstacles placed in the way of a claimant's access to the courts must
be reexamined in light of present circumstances.
B. Procedural Due Process
Article I, section 22 of the Constitution of the State of Florida
states that the right to trial by jury shall be "secure to all and
remain inviolate."'2 9 Thus, given this entitlement, 3 " certain proce-
dural safeguards are required by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The issue in this context is whether the
burden of mandatory screening panels as a condition precedent to
a jury trial is violative of the due process protection guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment. 3'
In Carter v. Sparkman,'32 the Supreme Court of Florida failed
to give consideration to the impact of the Medical Malpractice Re-
form Act on a claimant's right to trial by jury. 133 The court did not
consider whether the provision rendering the mediation panel's de-
cision admissible in a subsequent trial 3' discourages a claimant
from electing to bring his case to trial. A report by the American Bar
Association on medical malpractice legislation noted that the ad-
missibility of the panel's decision at a later date "may effectively
dissuade the losing party from continuing on to court, for a negative
decision by the panel is bound to carry some weight with the jury
and lessen the losing party's chances of success."'' Commentators
have also noted the dangers raised by making a mediation panel's
recommendation admissible at a subsequent trial. As one commen-
tator has pointed out:
Many screening panel arrangements [like Florida's] do not re-
quire a stenographic record of the hearing; due to the informal
nature of the review, and the possibility that either party may be
128. See notes 1-11 and accompanying text supra.
129. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 22.
130. An entitlement is a substantive right derived "from an independent source such as
state law." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). The modern Court has used
the search for an entitlement as a threshold question in due process analysis. See, e.g., Bishop
v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). Once the Court determines that an entitlement exists, as in
the instant case, inquiry is made into how much process is due.
131. Comment, The Constitutional Considerations of Medical Malpractice Screening
Panels, supra note 1, at 172.
132. 335 So. 2d at 802.
133. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
134. FLA. STAT. § 768.47(2) (1977); see text accompanying note 51 supra.
135. ABA REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY 44 (1977). The
report cited, inter alia, Florida's statute as an example of a statute raising the problem of
influence on a jury's decision.
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able to admit the panel's recommendation into evidence at trial,
there is a great danger of prejudice. Statutes vary as to whether
panel members may be called as witnesses at trial; the tendency
is to admit the panel's conclusion but to disallow any participa-
tion by panel members. Where applicable, the jury should be
instructed that the finding of the panel is not binding. Despite
these attempted safeguards, it is highly likely that a jury of lay
people will accord great weight to such findings. "I
Some of the statutes providing for the admissibility of a media-
tion panel's findings have not been upheld by the courts. In Ohio,
for example, a lower court found that such a provision violates a
medical malpractice plaintiff's right to a jury trial."7 The Ohio stat-
ute provides for the compulsory submission of medical malpractice
claims to a three member "arbitration board."'' 8 The board's deci-
sion, subject to review by the trial judge, is admissible at trial.' 9
Despite the fact that the Ohio statute provides safeguards by sub-
jecting the panel's decision to review and by permitting panel mem-
bers to be cross-examined at the trial, the court found the statute
to be constitutionally deficient."' The court explained that the in-
troduction of the panel's finding placed an additional burden upon
the plaintiff to persuade the jury that the decision of the arbitrators
was incorrect. "The right to trial by jury is thus substantially re-
136. Comment, Michigan's Medical Malpractice Legislation-Prognosis: Curable
Defects, 55 J. UaB. L. 309, 313-14 (1978) (emphasis added). See also Harlan, supra note 119,
at 61. A constitutional attack based on a right to a jury trial, however, was rejected in the
case of In re Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625 (1955), appeal dismissed sub nom., Smith v.
Wissler, 350 U.S. 858 (1955). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld a mandatory
screening panel on the theory that while the jury trial is delayed, it is not denied. Id. at 231,
111 A.2d at 629.
137. Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (Comm.
P1. 1976).
138. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.21(A) (Page Supp. 1978).
139. Id. § 2711.21(C).
140. The court noted that:
The Plaintiff identifies the unusual burden the party who loses in arbitration
must overcome at trial in order to counter the introduction into evidence of the
arbitrator's decision and the testimony of the individual arbitrators. While it is
true that the findings of the arbitrators are not findings in a subsequent jury trial
and, therefore, the right to trial by jury guaranteed by Article I, Section 5 of the
Ohio Constitution is not violated in that respect, the fact that an additional
burden and additional restrictions are created by the compulsory arbitration
procedure of R.C. Section 2711.21, which place added pressure and expense upon
a Plaintiff or Defendant who loses at arbitration and which, of course, is entirely
unique to medical malpractice claims, does raise, as pointed out above, both
equal protection problems and the question of the right guaranteed to all litigants
to trial by jury.
3 Ohio Op. 3d at 168, 355 N.E.2d at 907 (footnote omitted).
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duced in terms of the value of that right to a party who desires to
challenge the decision of the arbitrators."''
The basis of the problem in the procedural due process context
is the composition of the panel and the nature of its finding. The
membership of the panel "stacks the deck" against the plaintiff in
a number of ways. First, the fact that one member of the Florida
mediation panel is a circuit judge cannot fail to have an impact on
the jury.' Given the respect which a jury of laymen normally
accords to a judge, the protection allegedly afforded by the Florida
statute-by directing that the panel finding is to be given only such
weight as the jury chooses to ascribe to it-is simply illusory.
Second, the participation of a physician in the mediation panel
proceedings raises obvious problems for a plaintiff. The Supreme
Court of the United States has placed tremendous emphasis on
securing neutrality in court proceedings.' Because "the appearance
of evenhanded justice . . . is at the core of due process,""' the Court
has declared that decisionmakers will be disqualified even if they
have no actual bias so long as they might reasonably appear to be
biased.'
In Gibson v. Berryhill, "I the Supreme Court of the United
States held that procedural due process was violated on neutrality
141. Id. at 169, 355 N.E.2d at 908. The court then added:
While the right to proceed to a jury trial still exists under R.C. Section
2711.21, it is clearly not a free and unfettered right as was certainly intended by
the framers of Article I, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution. Therefore, the arbitra-
tion provisions under R.C. Section 2711.21, which permit the introduction into
evidence and exposure to the jury of the arbitrator's decision, are a violation of
the right to trial by jury.
Id. See also Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976)
(because Illinois' statute is unconstitutional on the ground that it vests mediation panels
with judicial functions, it follows that mediation panel procedure is an invalid restriction on
the right to jury trial).
142. This point was raised with respect to the Wisconsin statute in Wisconsin Medical
Malpractice, supra note 65, where it was observed that "participation of the judge in the
panel clothes the panel finding with respectability and renders the finding very persuasive
evidence . . . . When there is a judge serving on the panel there are sound reasons for leaning
in the direction of over-protection of the claimant who proceeds to trial." Id. at 854. See also
the comments on the Virginia statute in Aldrich, Alternatives to the Medical Malpractice
Phenomenon: Damage Limitations, Malpractice Review Panels and Countersuits, 34 WASH.
& LEE L. Rav. 1179 (1977).
143. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), where Justice White, concurring and
dissenting in part, stated that "the right to an impartial decision-maker is required by due
process." Id. at 197.
144. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 469 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
145. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1972). See American Cyanamid Co. v.
FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966), where the Sixth Circuit stated that "both unfairness and
the appearance of unfairness should be avoided." Id. at 767.
146. 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
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grounds when a state board of optometry revoked the licenses of all
optometrists who were employed by business corporations."7 The
Court considered it important that the licenses that were revoked
accounted for half of all the optometrists practicing in the state,
that the board was composed of optometrists in private practice for
their own account, and that "success in the Board's efforts" could
"rebound to the personal benefit of members of the board.""' At
least the last two factors considered in Berryhill are equally applica-
ble to the composition of the Florida mediation panel. The Court
further held that "those with substantial pecuniary interest in legal
proceedings should not adjudicate these disputes.""' As one com-
mentator has pointed out:
The requirement that one member of the tribunal be a practicing
physician or other healthcare provider is per se prejudicial in
favor of the defendant because no corresponding member repre-
sents the interests of the plaintiff. The physician member invari-
ably experiences some conflict between his concern for maintain-
ing high standards in his profession and his awareness of his own
potential as a malpractice defendant, and it is probable that this
conflict results in partiality toward fellow physicians in some
cases. Obviously present for the practical purposes of interpreting
the standard of care applicable to a particular medical procedure,
and to assist the other panel members in reviewing medical re-
cords and reports, the physician nevertheless threatens the right
of the plaintiff to an impartial determination of the facts.'"
The problem of partiality toward fellow members of the profes-
sion is compounded in Florida by the fact that, in many cases, a
147. Id. at 578-79.
148. Id. at 578.
149. Id. at 599 (citing Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510 (1927)). This indicates that a financial stake need not be as direct or positive as
it appeared to be in Tumey. It should be noted that this due process argument comprehends
that to have a biased decisionmaker is unfair, not that there is an absolute denial to a fair
trial, which is more in the way of a substantive due process argument. Florida cases are in
accord. See, e.g., Power v. Chillingworth, 93 Fla. 1030, 113 So. 280 (1927) where the Supreme
Court of Florida stated:
Disqualification to adjudicate a cause rests on the ancient maxim that no
man should sit as a judge in his own case. This maxim is applicable to all classes
of cases and in all courts, and appeals so strongly to one's sense of justice that it
was said by Lord Coke to be a natural right, so inflexible that an act of Parliament
seeking to subvert it would be declared void.
Id. at 1032, 113 So. at 281; accord, State ex rel. Central Farmers' Trust Co. v. Chillingworth,
107 Fla. 747, 143 So. 294 (1932); State ex rel. Mickle v. Rowe, 100 Fla. 1382, 131 So. 331 (1931);
State ex rel. First Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chillingworth, 95 Fla. 699, 116 So. 633 (1928).
150. Mass. Medical Malpractice, supra note 12, at 1305 (footnote omitted).
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portion of the plaintiff's ultimate recovery may come from a pa-
tient's compensation fund to which the physician panel member
himself has contributed.' The physician member's impartiality,
then, may be affected not only by the fact that he is being asked to
rule on the liability of a fellow health care provider but also by the
fact that a finding of liability may result in increased assessments
against him personally. 52 Under these circumstances, a medical
malpractice plaintiff is faced with overcoming persuasive evidence
which is, from the outset, tainted by partiality and prejudice.
The influence of the judicial referee and the presumptive par-
tiality of the physician member raise two substantial obstacles to a
fair jury trial for the plaintiff. In addition, the Florida malpractice
claimant cannot look to the attorney panel member for protection
of his interests. While the Act makes explicit provision for the physi-
cian or health care provider member to be a specialist in the medical
field involved,' no such provision is made for the attorney member,
who is required only to be a "qualified attorney."'8 4 There is no
requirement that he be a specialist in the medical malpractice field.
Thus, only one panel member can be expected to have any expertise
in the issues upon which the panel must make its finding. Given this
imbalance in expertise, it follows that both the judicial referee and
the attorney panel member may be unduly swayed by the opinion
of the physician or health care provider member.
The danger of prejudice to the plaintiff, however, is not limited
151. See FLA. STAT. § 768.54 (1977).
152. See State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978), where
Justice Abrahamson, dissenting in part, observed:
A central element of justice is impartial decision-making. A decision maker
who has an interest in the outcome of the litigation cannot fairly adjudicate the
case. It is not possible to define with precision the degree or type of pecuniary
interest which will disqualify a decision maker ...
The financial interest need not be direct; an indirect financial benefit may
also be prejudicial.
Id. at 536, 261 N.W.2d at 455 (citation omitted). The issue upon which Justice Abrahamson
was commenting was whether the annual assessment against the medical members of a
mediation panel was an extra element of unfairness, making the panel suspect. While the
majority of the court had found that any financial interest on the part of the medical panel
members was too remote and speculative, Justice Abrahamson disagreed, finding no suffi-
cient factual basis for this holding. He stated that he would have held that the financial bias
of the panel members, if any, should be allowed to be shown and commented upon, both by
the parties in arguments and by the presentation of witnesses. Id. at 537, 261 N.W.2d at 456.
153. See text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
154. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(2)(b) (1977). One study has concluded that the attorney-
member of a mediation panel should always be an experienced medical malpractice practi-
tioner. See INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PANELS IN FOUR
STATES 42 (1977) [hereinafter cited as I.J.A. STUDY].
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to the panel's composition. The nature of the finding which the jury
is permitted to consider also raises a number of dangers. At least
one court has pointed out that juries traditionally accord greater
weight to the testimony of experts."'s In this and other regards,
medical malpractice mediation panel findings have been character-
ized as "no different from any other expert testimony' received at a
trial." 6 Under the Florida Act, however, the mediation panel's
finding on liability is indeed accorded different treatment from
other expert testimony. Traditionally, expert opinion evidence is
admissible at trial only if all the facts upon which the opinion is
based are stated.'57 The Florida Act, in contrast, allows the admis-
sion of only the panel's finding. No transcript of the hearing is
required. Nor may the panel members be called to explain the basis
of their finding. 5 '
The Florida Act, therefore, permits the jury to consider a naked
opinion without providing the parties with a means to challenge
that opinion. Even in jurisdictions in which mediation panel stat-
utes have been upheld against jury trial attacks, the courts have
recognized that a statute which provides no such safeguards would
be constitutionally infirm.'5 ' Clearly, a malpractice plaintiff in Flor-
155. Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (C.P.
1976).
156. Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 105, 256 N.W.2d 657, 665 (1977).
157. See Note, Medical Malpractice Mediation Panels: A Constitutional Analysis, 46
FoRDHAm L. Rxv. 322 (1977), where the author suggests that if a panel decision is admissible,
the parties should be allowed to call the panelists at the trial to question them concerning
their decision on any area of their expertise. Id. at 348. Harlan, supra note 119, at 63-64. See
also Tarkoff v. Schmunk, 117 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959) (medical testimony not admis-
sible in actions for damages unless proper predicate for such testimony was laid).
158. See notes 45-46 and accompanying text supra. The admissibility of the panel's
decision as to liability also violates a traditional rule of evidence in that it "permits an opinion
to be submitted to the jury as evidence on the ultimate issue of liability." Comment, supra
note 1, at 180. The same commentator remarks that the judge and attorney panel members
are not medical experts and their opinion as to medical issues would not be admissible under
traditional evidence rules. Id. at 181.
Although under the analysis of Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d
at 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (C.P. 1976), the fact that panelists were allowed to be called to testify
was one of the factors which made the Act unconstitutional, the important point of the case
was that the decision of the panelists were admitted in the first place. It is suggested that
the admission of the panel finding by itself is what sways the jury and produces an undue
influence.
159. The New York decisions on this point are instructive. Under the New York statute,
the finding of the three member panel is admissible only if unanimous. N.Y. Jun). LAw § 148-
a(8) (McKinney Supp. 1978). If the recommendation is read to the jury, the doctor member
or the attorney member of the panel, or both, may be called by any party with regards to the
basis for it. Id. The value of the latter provision has been recognized repeatedly in the New
York courts. See Marrico v. Misericgrdia Hosp., 59 App. Div. 2d 680, 398 N.Y.S.2d 660 (Sup.
Ct. 1977) (statute allows counsel to explore alleged underlying weakness in panel's determina-
tion at the trial); Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 App. Div. 2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1976) (two of
19791 1179
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
ida runs a substantial risk when he submits his claim to a mediation
panel. If he chooses to proceed to a civil action once the panel has
made a finding of no liability, he must contend with the fact that
the jury will give the panel's finding a great deal of weight, based
on its respect for the judicial referee and the physician panel mem-
ber as well as the weight accorded to expert opinions.110 The plain-
tiff's only weapon against this obstacle is the comment permitted
in his opening and closing statements. Without incurring the cost
of a transcript, the plaintiff has no means of attacking the basis of
the panel's finding since he is not permitted to call the members
themselves as witnesses. Unquestionably, such procedures fly in the
face of our traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
When we look at the interest involved, the right to a fair and impar-
tial trial, it becomes evident that the amount of process provided
falls far short of the amount of process due.
It is not mere speculation that the composition of the panel
contributes to a greater number of adverse findings for the claimant.
Statistics compiled since the introduction of mediation panels in a
number of jurisdictions, including Florida, demonstrate the likeli-
three members of panel can be called by either party, thus giving further assistance to jury).
See also Kletnieks v. Brookhaven Memorial Ass'n, Inc., 53 App. Div. 2d 169, 385 N.Y.S.2d
575 (Sup. Ct. 1976). Contra, Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977) (en
banc), where the Supreme Court of Arizona rejected the contention that the panel members
should be able to testify at trial stating that the procedure would enable "the prevailing party
to bolster the panel's decision by testimony at trial .... " Id. at 581, 570 P.2d at 749.
Statutes in other jurisdictions provide similar safeguards for the parties. In Louisiana,
for example, the mediation panel's opinion is admissible, though not binding, and the mem-
bers of the panel may be called at a subsequent trial. Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256
(La. 1978). See also Butler v. Flint-Goodridge Hosp. of Dillard Univ., 354 So. 2d 1070 (La.
App. 1978), where the court commented:
An additional safeguard is provided by allowing the members of the panel to be
called as witnesses in a subsequent judicial proceeding, thereby assuring a litigant
the right to demonstrate the basis for the panel's opinion and to expose any
impropriety which may have formed part oi the opinion reaching process.
Id. at 1073.
Protection of a different type is afforded by the Maryland statute, which provides that
any contention that an award by a medical malpractice arbitration panel should be vacated
on the ground of corruption, fraud, partiality or the like is to be decided by the court prior to
trial. MD. C". & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(C) (Supp. 1971). Only if the award is not
vacated is it admissible at the trial. If the award is vacated, trial of the case proceeds as if
there had been no award. Id. § 3.2A-06(E). A similar provision is found in the Ohio statute.
Omo REv. CODE § 27.11.21(C)(1)-(3) (Supp. 1978).
160. It has been suggested that in view of the weight juries have traditionally given to
expert testimony, it is more likely that an unfair decision of the panel will be carried over
into a jury verdict. See Note, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation - A First Checkup,
50 TuL. L. REv. 655, 681 (1976); Note, Ohio's Rx for the Medical Malpractice Crisis: The
Patient Pays, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 90, 102 (1976) ("jury may give undue weight to the findings
. . . of the panel").
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hood of a finding of no liability. In Florida, for example, figures
compiled as of June 1, 1978 show that the odds against a plaintiff
in the mediation panel procedure are substantial. 6' Where the case
is processed through the hearing stage, the figures indicate that over
eighty-one percent of the panel findings statewide are in favor of the
defendant.' Thus, a noteworthy percentage of potential Florida
malpractice plaintiffs must make the decision on whether to seek a
jury trial in light of a negative panel decision, which will be ex-
tremely difficult to overcome.
Statistics compiled in other jurisdictions present substantially
the same evidence. In New York, while no formal statewide records
on medical mediation panels are available, some clerks and judges
have prepared data on the panels."3 In New York County, only
fourteen percent of the panels which reached unanimous deci-
sions-a prerequisite for admissibility at trial'"-found liability,
while fifty-one percent found for the defendant."6 ' In Nassau
County, eleven percent of the panels making unaminous findings
found liability, while twenty-six precent found in favor of the defen-
dant. '
In New Mexico, which has the most comprehensive statewide
data on the use of panels and their findings, the proportion of find-
161. Approximate figures as of June 1, 1978:
UPDATED EVALUATION OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MEDIATION
PANEL CASES COMPILED BY J. B. SPENCE
NO. CASES NO. CASES NO. CASES
NO. CASES PROCESSED RESOLVED RESOLVED
FILED SINCE THROUGH IN FAVOR IN FAVOR OF
-COUNTY NEW LAW HEARING STAGE OF DEFENDANT PLAINTIFF
D A D E ....... 701 .......... 194 ............. 179 .............. 15
BROW ARD ...... 371 .......... 115 ............. 69 .............. 19
BREVARD ....... 47 .......... 12 ............. 8 ............ 1
PINELLAS ...... 149 ......... 34 ............ 28 ............ 4
HILLSBOROUGH 232 .......... 60 ............. 47 .............. 13
ESCAMBIA ...... 56 ......... 23 ............ 17 ............ 6
PALM BEACH ... 131 .......... 64 ............ 43 ............ 8
ORANGE ........ 131 .......... 38 ............ 31 ............ 8
POLK .65.......... .. ..... 20............ 4
TOTALS: 1,883 541 442 78
162. See figures as cited in note 161 supra. In Dade County, the defendant prevailed in
92% of the panel hearings.
163. I.J.A. STUDY, supra note 154, at 15.
164. N.Y. JuD. LAw § 148-a(8) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
165. I.J.A. STUDY, supra note 154, at 16.
166. Id.
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ings for the plaintiff has decreased as the panel's caseload has
risen.' In New Jersey, statistics were compiled showing the per-
formance of panels, established by court rule, which may be invoked
by plaintiffs on a voluntary basis. The panels consist of two physi-
cians, two attorneys and a retired judge. "' In 1975, of the cases in
which panel hearings were completed, ninety-three percent resulted
in findings of no liability.'
These available statistics make it clear that a panel composed
of physicians, lawyers and an impartial referee is far more likely to
saddle a plaintiff with a negative finding. Since juries tend to agree
with panel findings,7 0 a plaintiff may be effectively dissuaded from
bringing his claim before a jury' when the finding is admissible at
a later trial. The experience in New Mexico is illustrative. Seventy-
three percent of the plaintiffs who had lost before hearing panels did
not pursue their claim.) The Florida Act is particularly discourag-
ing to the plaintiff in that he has no effective means of challenging
the panel's conclusion.
The Florida Medical Malpractice Reform Act has effectively
burdened a substantial number of potential malpractice plaintiffs
with an unjustified obstacle to an impartial jury verdict. Not only
is there serious doubt as to the ability of the mediation panel to
render an impartial decision, but it also appears that the subse-
quent-trial is tainted by the effects of the panel's decision to the
point of losing its neutral character. The right to due process protec-
tion under the fourteenth amendment, triggered by the Florida con-
stitutional guarantee of a right to trial by jury, demands far more
procedural protection for malpractice plaintiffs than is currently
provided.
VI. CONCLUSION
The constitutional deficiencies of the Florida Medical Malprac-
tice Reform Act, as presented and analyzed in this article, were not
167. Id. at 26. The New Mexico panel consists of three health care providers and three
attorneys, each with one vote, and a chairperson attorney who votes only in the event of a
tie. In 1976, of cases actually heard by a panel, 83% resulted in findings for the defendant.
In only 17% of the cases was the plaintiff successful. Id. at 27. Data on the impact of panel
decisions on subsequent litigation is equally startling. Of the 56 cases where the panel found
no negligence, 73% were subsequently dropped or dismissed. Id. at 28.
168. Id. at 29.
169. Id. at 31.
170. "Juries generally agree with panel findings, although it is not clear whether it is
because they are impressed with the panel's findings or because they view the evidence
similarly." Id. at 15.
171. See text accompanying notes 135-136 supra.
172. I.J.A. STUDY, supra note 154, at 26.
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adequately addressed by the Supreme Court of Florida in Carter v.
Sparkman. 73 Instead, the court limited its consideration to the
equal protection issue. While the court should, when possible,
"resolve all doubts as to the validity of a statute in favor of its
constitutional validity,"'' it is beyond the scope of the court to give
undue deference to a legislative judgment when that judgment is
violative of basic constitutional protections.
A reexamination of these constitutional issues, as well as other
policy considerations, is now necessary. In light of new circumstan-
ces which have arisen since 1975, the reason for the Act has ceased
to exist. It is therefore submitted that the legislature itself should
repeal the Act if the supreme court is unwilling to declare it uncon-
stitutional.
173. 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976).
174. Id. at 805.
